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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Preliminaries
  A careful reader of English would be sure to notice the differences in
meaning and implication i  such a set of sentences a : 
  (1) a. He was not at all sure that his method would have been an 
        improvement. (I. Murdoch, The Bell) 
      b. He sat there dazed for a minute, not sure if hewas really 
    awake.  (Ibid.) 
      c. Michael was not sure at firstwhether Patchway was not under 
        a misapprehension.  (Ibid.) 
      d. He was not sure what it was, here, that he was regretting. 
 (Ibid.) 
The predicate  `(be) sure', if negated, can be followed by any of the three 
complementizers: that,  iflwhetheri),  wh-2). 
  Some more instances may be called upon to clarify the point in 
question. 
  (2) a. An owner of an alsatian may have a radically different image 
        of dogs from an owner of a miniature poodle, but it is not 
        obvious that they thereby speak a different language. 
                             (R. Kempson, SemanticTheory)
      b. It is not clear whether their interpretation can be analysed in 
         terms of concepts. 
(2) exemplifies a variety of (extraposed) sentential subjects with respect to 
the complementizers which they take. The following examples show a 
lexical diversity of predicates. (These are not meant o be an exhaustive 
presentation f the types of complements which each predicate allows.)
1) If and whether will be treated as interchangeable in this paper. 
2) Wh- represents uch words as who, which, what, when, where, why, how. 
                        54
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  (3) a.  'You know that he gave up his house at Loomouth?' 
 `Ah
, no, I did not know it. I am  surprised.' 
 `I don't know that I am.' (A. Christie, Murder in Three Acts) 
      b. He did not know whether he was glad or sorry. (TheBell) 
  (4) a. He got dressed, intending to make a tour round the house to 
        see that everything was all right.  (/bid.) 
      b. I don't see that I want to keep my mind off Jimmie. 
                             (M. Spark, Robinson)
      c. See if the postman has come.  (ISED) 
  (5) a.  'Ever see anyone die quite like that before?' 
 `No
, I can't say that I have. But I haven't really seen as many 
        deaths as you might  suppose.' (Murder in Three Acts) 
      b.  'Look upon the prisoner at the bar, and say whether she is 
        guilty or not  guilty.' (A. Christie, Sad Cypress) 
  (6) a.  'Do you think it is possible, that?'  `Do I think what is possible?' 
 `That Elinor Carlisle was unable to bear the sight of her aunt's 
        misery and helped her out of  existence.'  (Ibid.) 
      b. I must hink if I cannot do something. 
                          (T.Hardy,Tess of the  d'Urben'illes) 
  From the above it is clear that there is a subjective component in our 
response to a that-clause that is not adequately explained by the syntactic 
definitions. The that-clause suggests a complete situation to which the 
speaker is responding, and allows us, the third party, to see the various 
elements of complete interaction. It may be said to create a complete, if 
small, world in one's mind, or perhaps to put up a  finished picture in a 
frame. It seems to denote some state of affairs in the factual world. It, in 
short, constitutes a holistic whole. 
  Another comparisonof that-clauses with those beginning with other 
complementizers will illuminate the subtle but discernible difference 
between them. Consider the following: 
  (7) He was not sure that he was awake. 
  (8) He was not sure if he was awake. 
While (8) is quite neutral as to the question of his-being-awake, in (7) 
his-being-awake is being put forward as established. And yet one would
56 THE THAT-CLAUSE REVISITED 
have gone too far to infer, from (7), i.e. from the use of the 
that-complementizer, that he was really awake. (The predicate  'awake' 
may complicate the matter unnecessarily because of its implication of 
consciousness, but the point in question should be clear.) How, then, are 
we to characterise the nature of that-complements? 
  This paper aims at definingwhat makes that-clauses what they are,  i.e. 
what flavours them with holistic overtones, by giving a formal characterisa-
tion to the heretofore inadequately explained features of that-clauses and 
exploring their source.
2. The Notion of Sententiality 
  Those characters of that-clauses delineated in the preceding section 
might be attributed to the fact that  that-clauses are qualified as (full) 
sentences, in other words, possess qualifications for being a sentence. And 
this reminds us of the term sententiality. 
  Recently linguists have begun to speak with increasing frequency of 
 sententiality,3) or the S-likeness 4) of sentential complements. These 
terms could be defined as the transition from a full to a nominal clause 
with respect o the degree of saturatedness of complements. The vertical 
column in the figure indicates this scalar transition to sentential 
completeness.
main clause  yes/no question wh-question
that-clause whether-clause  wh-clause
for-to
Accusative-ing
Possessive-ing
Action Nominal
Derived Nominal
noun
Note that other than the main clause (henceforth, matrix sentence), the
3) e.g.  Kageyama (1976) 
4) e.g. Nakamura (1976)
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that-clause isthe most sentential ofall the complements, and also that the 
scale has as the other extreme nominals or perhaps nouns. 
  Instead of dwelling on sententiality in its vertical transition,  i.e. the 
transition from lesser to greater sentential completeness, our main concern 
will be the horizontal dimension, that is the that-clause incontrast to the 
equally but differently complete matrix sentence and indirect question 
(hereafter, embedded question). I am  not suggesting, however, that the 
two dimensions entail separate notions of sententiality. They are, on the 
contrary, one and the same, despite their diverging implications. The two 
paths meet at that. Studies of both notions aim at answering the question, 
 `What is sententiality?' 
  But those scholars who are concerned with the degree of sententiality, 
 i.e. the vertical column in the figure, are primarily concerned with the 
presence or absence of certain syntactic elements, and only demonstrate 
what is more, and what is less, sentential, without giving a full account of 
what it is to be fully sentential. My analysis will attempt o characterise 
full sententiality, and, by discriminating between some of the types of 
clauses at the upper end of the scale,  will also supplement those studies 
which concentrate exclusively on the degree of sententiality.
II. THE THAT-CLAUSE REVISITED 
1.  Presupposition 
  One might quite casually or innocently identify the factuality of 
that-clauses with the notion of presupposition, by saying that the 
employment of that-clauses, when compared with other types of com-
plements, implies, or to use a word immune from technical complexity, 
indicates, the speaker's  commitment o, or involvement in, the truth of the 
complement clauses. Taken seriously, this seemingly plausible view would 
be tantamount to the treatment of the factivity of  complements as 
presuppositional or entailmental. There has been a vast amount of studies 
on the subject of the presupposition of referring expressions and 
complement sentences, and the approach to the factivity of complements 
varies according to the viewpoint one adopts on the questions of whether
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or not semantics should be operated within  two-valued logic and where 
one should draw the demarcation li e between semantics and  pragmatics. 
  Getting back to the  question of identifying the factuality of  that-
clauses with their factivity, it should be noted that the question of 
 whether: those relations are ones of presupposition r merely of entailment 
is irrelevant for our purpose, since there are sentences containing sentential 
complements in which the entire sentence neither presupposes, nor entails, 
(the truth of) their complements. One example will suffice: 
  (9) John thinks that Mary is ill. 
There are, indeed, sentences in which (the truth of) the complement is 
asserted rather than presupposed as in (10). 
  (10) He insisted that he saw a ghost. 
We could even  find sentences in which the falsity, not the truth, of the 
complement is presupposed: 
  (11) Jane pretended that she was an acrobat. 
  Thus we are obliged to come to theconclusion that the holistic, factual 
implication cannot be ascribed to the factivity of complements, for, in 
asking what makes that-clauses sentential, we have in mind some property 
which is common to all their occurrences, regardless of the main verbs to 
which they are complemented. 
2.  The Bearer of Truth-Values 
  We shall discuss in this section the view that, granting that sentences 
with that-clauses do not necessarily presuppose the truth of the com-
plement, he that-clause does at least bear a truth-value, true or false, from 
which fact it derives its nature. 
  A  detailed• iscussion of the problem of what bears the  truth-value can 
be set aside for the moment, because the analysis of the capability of 
bearing a truth-value applies not just to that-clauses but universally to 
(matrix) declarative s ntences, a general discussion ofwhich would be out 
of place here. 
  Let us then tentatively adopt the Katzian  views) on the  'matter: 
 5) See  Katz  (1972)
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dismissing the other possible candidates for the bearer of truth-values a  
susceptible of variation in contextual elements, we are left with  'non-
occasion  propositions'6) as the successful candidate for that logical entity 
which bears a fixed, unique truth-value. Applying this view to the case of 
the that-clause, it should be obvious first that the that-clause asit is is not 
a proposition, and thus not possessing the chief qualification, it utterly 
fails to bear truth-values.  Even if we acknowledge that sentences (not 
necessarily matrix) rather than propositions could bear truth-values, so
long as they expressed non-occasion propositions, the  that-clause in all its 
occurrences could not be said to have a (fixed) truth-value, simply because 
the that-clause, as it stands, may express occasion as well as non-occasion 
propositions. Thus we are to relinquish the hope that we might explicate 
the nature of that-clauses  solely on the basis of the capability of bearing 
truth-values. 
3. Proposition 
  The that-clause isoften spoken of as something which characteristically 
expresses a  'proposition'. The analysis of propositions has a long historical 
background behind it, and since their treatment varies according to the 
viewpoint one assumes, it  would be beyond the scope of our study to 
make a thorough examination of the extensive literature on the subject. 
Here we shall define  'proposition'  as that which is left when modality 
(whatever it is) is taken away from a sentence. 
  It is obvious enough that the that-clause characteristically expresses 
propositions, but it should be obvious also that, conversely, it is not the 
only form that expresses propositions. Declarative matrix sentences, to
begin with, express propositions just as well, and are much more typically 
the way of expressing propositions, as in (12). 
  (12) Mary is a pretty  girl  7) 
Secondly, we can observe, explicitly in transformational grammar and 
perhaps implicitly in traditional grammars, that a proposition does not 
necessarily require the linguistic or grammatical realisations of the form of
6)  i.e. the union of the classes of eternal and standing propositions 
7)  MOri  (1980)
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clauses. Another thing to be noted is that not only statements but also 
questions involve propositions with no less frequency and significance. 
  In sum, to attribute the nature of that-clauses to the fact that they 
express propositions is in one respect autological — one would have to ask 
why, then, propositions are holistic and factual — and in another respect 
erroneous since, as discussed just above, there are various forms other than 
that-clauses which express, or at least comprise, propositions just as well.
4. Predication 
  In the preceding section we observed that the that-clause is not the 
unique vehicle of propositions. One might then argue that since of the 
entities that could express propositions what sharply distinguishes that-
clauses (and matrix sentences) from other complements of lower degrees 
of sententiality is the presence of a predicate, the nature of the 
that-clauses should be attributed to the predicates. 
  While it is not my intention to go into ontological detail, it can be 
safely maintained that there are things in the world, actual or imaginary, 
and that we have  'thoughts' concerning those things. We predicate 
something (or a linguistic expression) of those objects. What must be 
noted here is that at this stage, where a thought has been moulded into a 
proposition, everything is potential or still in the offing, to employ an apt 
metaphor. We should be well aware of the isolation or abstraction of this 
stage from a complete sentence. It would surely prove to be an abortive 
scheme to make predication somehow significant in terms of illocutionary 
force. To  'predicate' in this context does not only fail to assert hat an 
object has the property which the predicate xpression is ascribing, but 
also should not be taken to imply the existence of the object, or the state 
of affairs, for that matter. A crucial case would be existential propositions 
like (13): 
  (13) There are canals on  Mars.8) 
One might claim that in an existential proposition a predicate does indeed 
assert hat an object exists. But that he is mistaken can be easily seen, for 
 8),9) Geach (1972)
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exactly the same proposition may occur unasserted without change of 
content, as in (14): 
  (14) If there are canals on Mars, then Mars is inhabited.9) 
Therefore predication should not be associated or confused with such 
illocutionary acts as asserting, stating, affirming, declaring, and so forth. 
This leads us to the discussion of the structure of utterances.
5. The Source of the Nature of That-Clauses 
  In the preceding sections we have reviewed several of the notions 
offered in the semantic literature, and have decided that those notions 
hardly provide accommodation, so to speak, for all the cases in which a 
 that-clause occurs. Now we can  finally get down to the examination ofthe 
logical structure of utterances. 
  Russell and Whitehead (1910), following Frege, introduce the so-called 
assertion-sign  `1—'. Hare (1950,70) differentiates two functions ascribed to 
the sign. That gives us a three-barrelled structure of utterances: to use his 
terms, the  `neustic', which is the sign of subscription to an assertion or 
other speech act; the  'tropic', which specifies the kind of speech-act that 
the sentence is characteristically used to perform, and corresponds to the 
 `mood' (in the sense in which indicative and imperative are moods); and 
the  `phrastic', that part of a sentence which is governed by the tropic and 
is common to sentences with different tropics. A sentence uttered, 
therefore, can be said to be normally provided with all three of the barrels. 
  Equipped with the requisite devices, we are now in a position to pin 
down the source of the unique character of that-clauses. Many properties 
are inherited intact when a declarative s ntence isenclosed in a that-clause. 
In other words, we might say that a that-clause is an enclosed eclarative 
sentence. But there ought to be a crucial difference between the two. 
From the facts that the function of expressing propositions i obviously 
common to matrix declarative sentences and that-clauses, and that a 
separate speech act could not possibly be performed in subordinate 
clauses, it follows that the difference between them lies somewhere in that 
part of an utterance which specifies speech acts. Hare (1970) suggests that
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a sentence which occurs categorically has a sign of mood or tropic, but 
also a sign of subscription or neustic, and that when it is embedded, it 
takes its tropic with it, but loses its neustic. 
  So this is it. The fact that a that-clause has not just its phrastic but also 
its tropic explains the uniqueness of the that-clause. The tropic identifies 
the type of speech act that some illocutionary-force indicating-device s 
used to perform. The tropic which a that-clause has is an indicative tropic, 
indicating that it is standardly used to perform  'one of the genus of speech 
acts which we may call "assertions"  '10). We might say, in short, that a 
that-clause is felt to give an expectation or promise that it will be used to 
perform the act of asserting. We may conclude that, owing to its tropic, a 
that-clause is felt to give promise of being normally used to perform the 
act of asserting, and hence  comes the character of that-clauses, as opposed 
to matrix sentences, which do assert, and to unsaturated complements, 
which are deprived of their tropics; and also that full sententiality may be 
associated, or even identified, with (the presence of ) the (indicative) 
tropic. 
  On the horizontal scale of sententiality the difference between 
that-clauses and embedded questions could be attributed to the difference 
in the kind of promise which is given to us: the former is that of asserting, 
and the latter, that of, perhaps, questioning.
 III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  That-clauses are plain entities which have been much discussed. A lively 
concern has been entertained for the factivity and assertivity of comple-
ments, for sententiality accounts of derivationally related complements, 
for logical manipulations of propositions, and so on, and yet no serious 
thought has been bestowed on what is the inherent character of 
that-clauses that is revealed in all their occurrences. So I  have taken the 
trouble of revisiting them, and have shown that the discriminating features 
of that-clauses can be best explained in terms of form and function in the 
 structure of utterances. From this we could move on to an appreciation f
the isolated that-clauses in (15):
10)  Hare (1970)
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  (15) What can you say about a twenty-five-year-old girl who died?  — 
      That she was beautiful. And brilliant. That she loved Mozart and 
      Bach. And the Beatles. And me. 
 (E.  Segal,  Love Story) 
  The observation of the interferences of negationand question with 
complement constructions, and the proper incorporation of the act of 
questioning into the logical structure of utterances are some of the 
important matters which require further treatment.
                   Selected Bibliography 
Cooper,  D.E.  (1973)  Philosophy and the Nature of Language, Longman. 
Geach, P.T. (1972) Logic Matters, Univ. of California. 
Hare, R.M. (1950) Extract from  'Practical Reason', in Practical Inferences. 
Hare, R.M. (1970)  'Meaning and Speech Acts', in Practical Inferences. 
Hare, R.M. (1971) Practical Inferences, Macmillan. 
Huddleston, R.D. (1971) The Sentence in Written English, CUP. 
 Kageyama, T. (1976)  'Sentence Accessibility', Descriptive and Applied Linguistics 
  vol. 9, ICU. 
Katz,  J.J. (1972) Semantic Theory, Harper. 
Kempson, R. (1975) Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics, CUP. 
Lyons, J.  (1977)  Semantics  I &  II, CUP. 
Menzel, P. (1975) Semantics and Syntax  in Complementation, Mouton. 
Moore, G.E. (1959)  'Is Existence a  Predicate?  ', in A.G.N. Flew (ed.), Logic and 
  Language, Basil Blackwell. 
 Mori, Y. (1980) Eigo no  GoyOron,  Taishilkan. 
Nakamura, M. (1976)  'The Degree of S-Likeness of Complement Sentence and its 
  Implications', in Studies in English Literature, 1976. 
Russell, B. & A.N. Whithead (1910) Principia Mathematica, CUP. 
Searle, J.R. (1969) Speech Acts, CUP. 
Vendler, Z. (1967) Linguistics in Philosophy, Cornell UP.
